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Comments
The 1984 RICO Amendments: Will
Defendants and their Attorneys be
Short-Changed?
RICO, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,'
is the most significant piece of federal legislation ever enacted per-
taining to patterned criminal conduct.' The original purpose of RICO
was to take the economic incentive out of organized crime.3 In 1984,
Congress amended RICO,4 and as a result, the amendments may
adversely impact RICO defendants and their attorneys.
In January 1979, a federal task force was formed in San Fran-
cisco.' to develop a case against members of the Hells Angels Motor-
cycle Club for RICO violations. 6 The task force consisted of agents
from the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI.7 An investigation
was prompted due to suspicion of prolific involvement by the Hells
Angels in the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine.8 The
government was also concerned about the illicit association of the
Hells Angels with firearms. 9 In July 1979, thirty-three Hells Angels
were indicted as a result of the task force investigation.' 0 The indict-
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
2. Wynn & Anderson, Organized Crime, RICO, and the Media; What We Think We
Know, 46 FED. PROBATION 9, 10 (Dec. 1982).
3. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-92, reprinted in, 1984 9A U.S.CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1587-89.
4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040, 2192 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as the 1984
amendments].
5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Digest of RICO Investigations
121 (1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as Digest of RICO Investigations].
6. Id. at 121-22.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 121.
9. Id. The task force intensified the investigation when a Solano County Sheriff narcotics
detective was nearly killed by an explosive device on the day he was scheduled to testify against
a member of the Hells Angels. Similar attempts were reported on the lives of San Jose and
San Diego investigators involved in Hells Angels cases. Id.
10. Id. at 122.
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ment charged that certain members of the Hells Angels maintained
a drug enterprise. 1 The enterprise was involved in the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, and possession of heroin, cocaine, mari-
juana, methamphetamines, LSD, and seconal.' 2 The indictment further
specified that members of the Hells Angels had used every illegal means
necessary to ensure the continued existence and success of the drug
enterprise.' 3 Members of the motorcycle club used sophisticated elec-
tronic equipment to monitor law enforcement activity."' Records were
maintained on known or suspected informants, law enforcement
officers, potential witnesses, and other persons who posed a threat
to the drug enterprise.' 5 The information gathered often led to more
violent tactics. The motorcyle club resorted to murder, assault, and
bribery of law enforcement officers. 6 Threats and intimidation were
used to discourage persons from testifying against club members.' 7
RICO was used in the indictment of the Hells Angels because the
statute was designed to halt these patterns of criminal activity.' 8
Journalists, scholars, law enforcement officials, and laymen associate
organized crime with the Mafia and with other ruthless groups like
the Hells Angels.' 9 The Congressional Statement of Findings and Pur-
poses for the Organized Crime Control Act of 197020 makes clear
that Congress viewed "the Mob" as the target of organized crime
legislation.2' In practice, however, RICO has been applied to a broader
range of defendants.22 RICO has been used to encompass not only
those who fit the traditional stereotype of organized crime members,
but also defendants involved in more ordinary activity. 23 The number
of RICO cases that have arisen in the past ten years supports this
premise. Between 1970 and 1975 few cases were brought under RICO.24







18. Id. at 1.
19. See Martens & Longfellow, Shadows of Substance: Organized Crime Reconsidered,
46 FED. PROBATION 3, 3-9 (Dec. 1982).
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1970).
22. Wynn & Anderson, supra note 2, at 9-10.
23. Id. at 12. The defendants prosecuted under RICO who are not organized crime members
are generally involved in a host of common white collar crimes. These white collar crimes
include fraud, corruption, and embezzlement. Id.
24. Id.
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The number of RICO cases escalated, however, soon after prosecutors
became familiar with the new statute and discovered the breadth of
conviction powers under RICO.2" By 1979, well over 200 criminal pro-
secutions were initiated under the statute. 26 Between 1980 and 1983
close to 560 persons were prosecuted under RICO.27 Other reports
show the volume of RICO cases continues to increase. 2 The natural
result of the increased application of RICO is that more attorneys
are called upon to defend the accused.
The 1984 RICO amendments may adversely affect those engaged
in criminal defense work.29 One federal court has construed the new
amendments to permit the forfeiture of defense attorneys' fees upon
the conviction of a RICO defendant." Since more defense attorneys
are now involved in RICO cases, a forfeiture of fees construction
will have a severe impact on many attorneys." California defense
attorneys working in both the federal and state courts will lose their
fees in RICO cases if a forfeiture construction is adopted.3 2 This con-
sequence is particularly devastating because defense of RICO cases
requires a substantial amount of time and effort.33 For example, the
1979 Hells Angels trial lasted eight months.3 4 The eight month period
did not include the months spent between indictment and trial in
preparation of the case.3 As a result of the time expended for the
defense of RICO cases, attorneys' fees are enormous. The average
private defense attorney receives a minimum of $100,000 in legal fees
for a complex RICO case.3 6
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Sentences Imposed Chart (1980-1983).
28. Wynn & Anderson, supra note 2, at 12.
29. See infra notes 73-120 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 73-120 and accompanying text. Defense attorneys are not the only group
likely to feel the economic impact of the 1984 amendments. When the attorney is not paid,
those employed by the attorney for investigative and forensic purposes will find their fees dif-
ficult to collect. The threat of fee forfeiture may make obtaining private expert services dif-
ficult for the RICO defense attorney in the future. Conversation with Dr. P. Cashman, Pro-
fessor of Criminalistics, California State University, Sacramento (February 15, 1986) (notes
on file at Pacific Law Journal).
32. See infra notes 73-120 and accompanying text.
33. Telephone conversation with A. J. Kramer, Esq. defense attorney for San Francisco
Federal Defender's Office (February 28, 1986) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal). The average
RICO case requires six to twelve months to adjudicate. Id.
34. Digest of RICO Investigations, supra note 5, at 126.
35. A majority of the counts resulted in a hung jury. Subsequently, another indictment
was handed down in 1980. Essentially the defense attorneys were required to begin the process
a second time, accumulating many more hours of work. Id.
36. Telephone conversation with A. J. Kramer, Esq. supra note 33.
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Attorneys defending RICO defendants expend valuable time and
energy and may never be compensated for their work. Defense counsel,
who suffers only economic loss, is not the only victim if fees are
considered forfeitable. The RICO defendant is subjected to a much
more significant injustice, the impairment of the sixth amendment
right to counsel."
This comment will examine some inequities defendants indicted under
RICO will suffer if attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture. 8 Initially,
the pertinent provisions and new amendments of RICO will be discuss-
ed in detail.39 Second, the process by which innocent third parties
can protect their interests in forfeitable property will be explored.4
In particular, consideration will be given to how this process relates
to attorneys." Next, a detailed analysis will be made of three con-
flicting federal cases dealing with the issue of forfeiture of attorneys'
fees.," Finally, this comment will show how forfeiture of attorneys'
fees will violate a RICO defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel.43 This proposition is divided in two sections."" The first sec-
tion analyzes the defendant's qualified right to choice of counsel.4"
Initially, the traditional situations in which the right to choice of
counsel has been denied will be set forth.4" Next, the RICO setting
will be distinguished from situations involving traditional denials of
the defendant's right to choice of counsel. 7 This comparison will show
that the qualified right to choice of counsel should be upheld in the
RICO setting. 8 The second section dealing with the RICO defendant's
violated sixth amendment rights explores the conflicts of interest that
arise for the RICO defense attorney if fees are forfeitable.49 These
conflicts will ultimately lead to the impingement of a RICO defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel.50 This comment will con-
clude with a proposal for modification of RICO legislation to exclude
attorneys' fees from forfeiture.5'
37. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
38. See infra notes 132-245 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 74-120 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 77-123 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 132-245 and accompanying text.
44. See id.
45. See infra notes 132-97 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 161-97 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 198-251 and accompanying text.
50. See id.
51. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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THE 1984 RICO AMENDMENTS
A. The Offense and Forfeiture Provisions
When first enacted, RICO was embodied in Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2 In 1984, Congress amended
the 1970 Act. The new version is called the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984.11
The offense provision14 of RICO contains a list of state and federal
crimes.5" Under the offense provision, a person committing two
52. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
53. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040, 2192 (1984).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
55. See Digest of RICO Investigations, supra note 5, at 3. Acts of Racketeering Activity:
A) State Crimes - Felonies











b) 224 (sports bribery)
c) 471, 472 (counterfeiting)
d) 659 (embezzlement from interstate or foreign shipments)
e) 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare fund)
f) 891, 892, 893, 894 (extortionate credit transactions)
g) 1084 (transmission of gambling information)
h) 1341 (mail fraud)
i) 1343 (wire fraud)
j) 1503 (obstruction of justice)
k) 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigation)
1) 1511 (obstruction of state or local law enforcement)
m) 1951 (Hobbs Act)
n) 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or aid of racketeering enterprise)
o) 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia)
p) 1954 (unlawful welfare fund payments)
q) 1955 (illegal gambling businesses)
r) 2314 (transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent
state tax stamps or articles used in counterfeiting)
s) 2315 (sale of stolen goods)
t) 2421, 2422, 2424 (whiteslave traffic)
2. 29 U.S.C.
a) 186 (restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations)
b) 501(c) (embezzlement from union funds)
3. Bankruptcy frauds including fraud in sale of securities 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-155.
4. Narcotic and dangerous drug felonies-manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment, buying, selling and dealing.
Id. at 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1984). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2. This California statute is most
similar to the federal RICO statute. Offenses within the California provision include the follow-
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designated state or federal crimes 6 within ten years is deemed to have
undertaken a pattern of racketeering activity."' Establishing a pattern
of racketeering is a prerequisite for applying the RICO penalty pro-
visions."8 The 1984 RICO amendments did not alter the offense pro-
vision significantly.5 9 The forfeiture provision,60 however, has
undergone major innovations.
The forfeiture provision states that any interest a defendant acquires
through a pattern of racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture. 6'
"Interest" has always been construed to mean direct interest 6 l in an
enterprise established, operated, controlled, or conducted in violation
of the offense provision. 63 A conflict among the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeal regarding whether "interest" also included the proceeds
or profits of racketeering activity.64 The United States Supreme Court
resolved the conflict in Russello v. United States.6" The Court declared
that any profit derived from racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture
under the forfeiture provision. 66 The Russello decision was codified
in the 1984 amendments. 7 As a result, more of a RICO defendant's
property is subject to forfeiture. 68 The forfeiture provision is now
ing: arson, bribery, felonious assault, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, gambling, kidnapping,
mayhem, murder, pimping and pandering, receiving stolen property, robbery, solicitation, grand
theft, and trafficking in control substances. Id.
56. Any combination of the federal or state crimes is acceptable, i.e., one state and one
federal, or two federal, or two state crimes. Digest of RICO Investigations, supra note 5, at 3.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(a), (b) (California provision
uses the term "criminal profiteering activity").
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (California counterpart).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1984).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(m) (1984).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.3 (California counterpart).
62. See United States v. Marubeni American Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1980)
(held assets subject to forfeiture include only direct interests in racketeering activity and not
the proceeds of the activity); United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowed
forfeiture of both direct assets of racketeering enterprise and its proceeds). Direct interest means
something other than income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. Marubeni, 611
F.2d at 766; see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 19 (1983) (illustration of direct
versus indirect interest). An example of the distinction between direct and indirect interest occurs
when a RICO defendant has obtained ownership and control over an apartment complex through
a pattern of racketeering activity. The apartment building constitutes a direct interest in a
racketeering enterprise. The rents obtained from leasing the apartments are an indirect interest
of the enterprise. Id.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)(D) (1984). See supra note 55 (statute set forth in pertinent part).
64. See Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 768; Martino, 681 F.2d at 956.
65. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
66. Id. at 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(m) (1984).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1984). The amended section provides in part that "any
property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or
indirectly, from racketeering activity . . . in violation of section 1962" shall be forfeited to
the United States. Id.
68. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 21.
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applied broadly to permit governmental seizure not only of assets in
an enterprise, but also of any proceeds derived therefrom. 69 An addi-
tional consequence is that innocent third parties 70 are affected by the
RICO forfeiture provision. 1
B. Innocent Third Parties and Subsection (M)
The 1984 RICO amendments provide a process by which third par-
ties can protect their interests in potentially forfeitable property.72
Subsection (m) of the forfeiture provision states that property will
be excluded from forfeiture if the petitioner was a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of the assets and had no knowledge the property
was subject to forfeiture." Problems have recently arisen in the federal
district courts, however, concerning the interpretation of subsection
(m) and how this provision relates to attorneys' fees. 4 If attorneys
representing RICO defendants are not considered bona fide purchasers
for value, money intended for payment of their services, or funds
already used to pay for fees, would be subject to forfeiture. 75 This
69. Id. at 20.
70. Innocent third parties are those claimants to forfeitable property who have no connec-
tion with the RICO defendant's illegal activity. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332, 1346 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
71. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text; Russello, 464 U.S. at 20.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1984). This section provides in pertinent part:
(2) any person, other than the defendant asserting a legal interest in property which
has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may . . .
petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in
the property. The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury ....
(5) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and witnesses
on his own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. The United
States may present evidence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of its claim
to the property and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition
to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall consider the rele-
vant portion of the record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of forfeiture.
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right,
title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because
the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant at
the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the pro-
perty under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest
in the property and was at the time of the purchase reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section; the court shall
amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination . . .
Id. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1984) with CAL. PENA. CODE §§ 186.7(b), 186.8(a) (these
sections provide third party remedies similar to RICO § 1963(m)).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (m)(6)(B) (1984).
74. See supra notes 77-123 and accompanying text.
75. See United States v. Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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construction would seriously interfere with several aspects of the sixth
amendment right to counsel.7 ' An examination of three 1985 federal
district. court cases will clarify the conflicting opinions interpreting
bona fide purchasers.
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. United States v. Rogers
In United States v. Rogers," the defendant was indicted under RICO
for mail fraud, racketeering, and the filing of fraudulent tax returns."
Consequently, the government filed for forfeiture of the defendant's
profits under subsection (rn)." Counsel for the defendant moved to
exclude attorney fees and costs from forfeiture, claiming that the
forfeiture provision does not provide for the seizure of assets trans-
ferred to attorneys for the performance of legitimate services.80 The
federal district court of Colorado held that an attorney who receives
fees for services rendered pays value because the lawyer devotes time,
skill, and effort for the client's cause.8 ' The Rogers court also focused
upon whether RICO defense attorneys have reasonable cause to believe
the assets used by defendants for fee payment may be subject to
forfeiture."
Although cases decided prior to the 1984 amendments have held
that knowledge of indictment and of the government's claim to
forfeiture is sufficient notice to a RICO defense attorney, 3 the Rogers
court did not consider these decisions controlling. ' Instead, the court
focused upon the critical question of what property is subject to
forfeiture under the RICO forfeiture provision." The forfeiture pro-
vision describes in detail the property eligible for potential forfeiture. 6
76. See infra notes 132-251 and accompanying text.
77. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
78. Id. at 1334.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1346.
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
84. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-47.
85. Id. at 1347.
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), (b) (1984). These sections provide in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall ... forfeit
to the United States irrespective of any provision of state law-




Property eligible for forfeiture includes assets possessed or controlled
by the defendant.87 The provision does not, however, define specifically
which assets, once transferred to third parties, are subject to
forfeiture. 8 The court reasoned that Congress must have intended
different treatment of assets transferred to third parties as compared
with assets in the hands of the defendant.8 9 Otherwise subsection (m),
specifically dealing with third party assets, would be meaningless
surplusage within the 1984 amendments.90
Since the forfeiture provision does not address whether attorneys'
fees are forfeitable, the court in Rogers turned to the legislative history
of the 1984 amendments for guidance.9 The Senate Report on subsec-
tion (m) indicates that only assets transferred to third parties as some
type of sham or artifice are forfeitable.92 Attorneys who render bona
fide services engage in neither a fraud nor sham.93 The transfer of
fees is an arm's length transaction and is not used to avoid the
forfeiture sanction.
94
The Rogers court also looked beyond the specific legislative history
of the 1984 RICO amendments to find that Congress recognized the
need to ensure the right to counsel in the context of third party
forfeiture of assets. 95 The court compared the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197096 to the RICO provisions.97
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source or influence
over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted,
or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of sec-
tion 1962.
(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes-
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and








92. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984). The report stated: "The provision
should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties . . . who have knowingly engaged
in sham or fraudulent transactions." Id.
93. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1970).
97. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
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The forfeiture provisions of the two statutes are very similar, both
in the content and the goals sought to be achieved. 98 The objective
of each act is to recover the profits resulting from the criminal
activity.99 Regarding the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act, the House Judiciary Committee stated that "nothing
in this section dealing with . . . forfeiture is intended to interfere
with a person's sixth amendment right to counsel."'' 0 A threat of
pretrial forfeiture of attorneys' fees would, however, make retention
of counsel of choice difficult for a RICO defendant.' 0' In addition,
impending forfeiture would give rise to serious ethical conflicts bet-
ween the attorney and the client after retention.'0 2 Both the interference
with retention of counsel of choice and the creation of ethical con-
flicts impede a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.'0 3 The
court in Rogers did not confront the sixth amendment issue square-
ly."" This issue, however, has been addressed by other courts.
B. United States v. Badalamenti
In United States v. Badalamenti, a federal district court for the
southern district of New York also supported nonforfeiture of
attorneys' fees.' 5 The court stated that forfeiture of legal fees paid
to a RICO defense attorney would create major constitutional and
98. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
99. Id.
100. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.1 (1984).
101. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
102. Id. at 196; see infra notes 198-251 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 132-251 and accompanying text.
104. The Rogers court suggested another theory on which nonforfeiture of attorneys' fees
may be based. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348 n.5; United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361
(9th Cir. 1984). In Ray, the defendant's property was subject to forfeiture and the court im-
posed a pretrial restraining order on the assets. Id. at 1365. The restraining order, however,
excluded expenditures for the necessities of life. Id. The court in Rogers suggested that while
representation by counsel may not "in the common sense meaning of the word, be considered
a 'necessary' like food or shelter," attorneys' fees have been considered necessities in some
legal contexts. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348 n.5. See, e.g., In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513,
521, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80, 468 P.2d 204, 208 (1970); Wolf v. Friedman, 20 Ohio St. 2d 49,
253 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1969). But see United States v. Gody, 678 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1979).
The district court wanted to exclude two of six pieces of defendant's property from forfeiture.
The defendant's wife had just given birth and the court felt some source of family support
should be provided. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, and held all of the property forfeitable.
Id.
105. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 195-98. Defense counsel was served with a subpoena
duces tecum by the government. Id. at 195. The government sought to obtain two types of
information pursuant to the subpoena procedure. First, the government wanted to show that
since the defendant possessed such a large amount of money to pay attorneys' fees, believed
to be in the vicinity of $500,000, evidence existed to help prove involvement of the accused
in narcotics trafficking. Id. Second, after dicovering the exact amount paid in fees, the govern-
ment would then seek to seize this amount under the RICO forfeiture provision. Id.
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ethical problems, a result Congress could not have intended.'" 6
Application of the forfeiture provision to attorneys' fees would violate
the sixth amendment right to counsel by making the possibility of
obtaining an attorney difficult.' 7 The likelihood that private defense
counsel cannot be retained arises when a pre-trial restaining order
has not been placed on a defendant's potentially forfeitable prop-
erty.' 08 The defendant retains control over the assets and, therefore,
cannot declare indigency and acquire appointed counsel.'0 9 Converse-
ly, private counsel will not represent RICO defendants if a threat of
106. Id. at 196. "Absent some supporting indication in the legislative history, I think it
most doubtful that Congress can have intended by its broad language to cover a special application
so clearly at odds with an accused defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to have counsel
defend the charge." Id. at 197. The sixth amendment was not the only constitutional issue
dealt with by the Badalamenti court. The court also addressed the constitutional ramifications
of the subpoena action of the court on the attorney-client privilege, the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination, the defense attorney's privilege against self-incrimination, and the
defendant's right to redress a grievance under the first amendment. Id. at 196-202.
107. Id. at 197.
If the statute applies to [the defense attorney], its message to him is "Do not repre-
sent this defendant or you will lose your fee." That being the kind of message lawyers
are likely to take seriously, the defendant will find it difficult or impossible to secure
representation. By the Sixth Amendment we guarantee the defendant the right of
counsel, but by the forfeiture provisions of . . . RICO . . . (if they apply to the
fee of the defense attorney), we insure that no lawyer will accept the business.
Id. at 196.
108. Id. at 197. See also 18 U.S.C. 1963(e) (1984) (pretrial restraining order of RICO).
The restraining provision states in pertinent part:
(e)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining
order . . . to preserve the availability of property described in subsection
(a) for forfeiture under this section-
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section
1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order
is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this sec-
tion; or
(B) prior to the filing of such indictment or information, if, after notice to persons
appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the
court determines that-i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in
the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or other-
wise made unavailable. ...
Id. Badalamenti takes a slightly narrower approach to forfeiture of attorneys' fees than does
Rogers. The Rogers court stated that forfeiture of attorneys' fees is not prescribed by RICO
under any circumstances. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348-51. The Badalamenti court, however,
took the position that if a pretrial restraining order is placed on a defendant's assets pursuant
to the restraining provision, the sixth amendment right to counsel is not violated. Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. at 197. The defendant receives appointed counsel, by claiming indigency, although
not counsel of choice. The problem arises when a pretrial restraining order has not been placed
on the defendant's property. The defendant can freely use the potentially forfeitable assets
to retain counsel. Since the possibility of forfeiture still exists as to this money, however, lawyers
will refuse to take the chance of representing the RICO defendant. The defendant "can get
neither a paid lawyer, nor a free one." In this regard the sixth amendment is violated. Id.
109. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
fee forfeiture exists upon the client's conviction. ' " Both Rogers and
Badalamenti construed legislative history as forbidding the forfeiture
of attorneys' fees."' Unlike Rogers, the Badalamenti court based the
nonforfeiture construction on a sixth amendment basis." 2 In 1985,
another federal district court in New York disagreed sharply with
Rogers and Badalamenti and held that forfeiture of attorneys' fees
under RICO did not violate the sixth amendment.
C. Payden v. United States
In Payden v. United States,"3 the court stated that a RICO defense
attorney has knowledge of information in the indictment and,
therefore, counsel receives funds with the knowledge that the money
is subject to forfeiture."' As a result, the attorney cannot qualify
under subsection (in) to retain an interest in fees paid from money
subject to the forfeiture provision." ' Counsel has not entered into
an arm's length transaction. ' 6 The Court held that an attorney knows
in advance the government may obtain superior title and, therefore,
assumes the risk that fees may be forfeited." 7
The Payden court also expressed concern that if attorneys' fees are
exempt from forfeiture, lawyers may become conduits for laundering
racketeer profits." 8 The court examined a report from the President's
Commission on Organized Crime, which revealed that a small group
110. Id. at 197-98.
111. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197; see supra notes 95-100, 106 and accompanying text.
112. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197-98.
113. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The facts of Payden are very similar to the situa-
tion in Badalamenti. Defendant Payden was indicted under RICO for maintaining a continuing
criminal narcotics enterprise. Id. at 844. The government sought forfeiture of all profits and
proceeds from the enterprise including cash seized from Payden's home, a 25% interest in
a company as represented by shares of stock, an automobile, and jewelry. Id. Payden's attorney
was served with a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 845. The government sought to obtain fee
information pursuant to the subpoena. Id. The fee information would help prove receipt by
Payden of substantial profits from narcotics trafficking. The defendant sought to quash the
subpoena on grounds that his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and
his fifth amendment right to be free from grand jury abuse were violated. Id. at 844-45.
114. Id. at 849 n.14.
115. See id. "The court has little sympathy for transferees in this group even though the
results of forfeiture may be harsh." Id.
116. Id. Arm's length transaction is used by the Rogers, Payden, and Badalamenti courts
to include dealings between an attorney and a client that are entirely legitimate and legal as
opposed to an attorney-client transaction that is in some way an artifice or sham. An example
of an illegitimate attorney-client transaction is one in which the client transfers funds to an
attorney in the form of fees but with the intention of escaping forfeiture of those funds. See
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198; Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
at 1342. "An attorney who receives funds in return for services legitimately rendered operates
at arm's length and not as part of an artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture." Id.
117. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
118. See id. at 850 n.14.
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of lawyers have become "critical elements in the life support system
of organized crime.'""9 An exemption for attorneys' fees would under-
mine the purpose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip economic
power from offenders.' 20
The sixth amendment right to counsel issue was addressed briefly
in Payden.12' The court construed the legislative history of the
forfeiture provision as allowing the courts to decide if forfeiture of
fees did or did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel.'
22
The court resolved the issue by declaring that retention of assets in-
tended for attorneys' fees under the forfeiture provision did not effect
a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.'
2 3
D. Discontent in the Federal District Courts
The Badalamenti, Rogers, and Payden decisions represent the
extremes in the controversy over forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Each
side of the controversy advances strong reasons in support of its respec-
tive position on forfeiture or nonforfeiture. The courts in Badalamenti
and Rogers reasoned that when fees are forfeitable, too many ethical
conflicts exist for forfeiture to pass constitutional muster.'
24 Further-
more, the legislative history of the 1984 RICO amendments does not
indicate that Congress intended forfeiture.' 25 The Payden Court, alter-
natively, took a dim view of RICO defendants and defense attorneys
and supported forfeiture of fees as an effective means to dislodge
119. Id. See also, Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Life Support," N.Y.L.J., March 11,
1985, at 1, col. 5. An attorney who represented members of La Cosa Nostra for more than
ten years provided extensive information to the Commission. The attorney estimated that there
are thirty lawyers, like himself, who help organized crime to effectively operate. The La Cosa
Nostra attorney admitted that his office was routinely utilized for family business because the
office was less likely a target of electronic surveillance by law enforcement. As a result of
the study, the Commission's staff has recommended that the U.S. Justice Department routinely
inquire into the sources of attorneys' fees during pretrial discovery. Id.
120. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
121. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
122. Id. at 850. "Congress intended not to resolve the sixth amendment conflict through
this legislation, but to leave the resolution of these issues to the court." Id. at 850 n.14. But
see Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
123. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14. The court merely noted several disciplinary rules
prohibiting lawyers from becoming involved in cases which may impair professional judgment.
"Fees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from forfeiture of the profits of illegal
enterprises." Additionally, the court reasoned that merely because a defendant's attorney is
compelled to disclose fee information, sixth amendment rights have not been impaired. Id.
The information is not privileged, and, even if incriminating, the attorney can still effectively
prepare for trial and capably represent the client. Id. at 847. But see supra note 112 and ac-
companying text.
124. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
125. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
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the economic base from organized crime.'26 Through the interpreta-
tion of the same legislative history used by Rogers and Badalamenti,
Payden employed judicial discretion to find an absence of any sixth
amendment violation.'
27
The controversy over forfeiture of fees has not been resolved by
the United States Supreme Court. Until the conflict regarding forfeiture
of fees under the 1984 amendments is resolved, the defense bar will
be faced with a difficult dilemma. If counsel chooses to represent
a RICO defendant, attorneys' fees ultimately may be forfeited.' 28 Alter-
natively, the attorney may avoid potential forfeiture by compromis-
ing the interests of the client and the legal profession. 29 Notwith-
standing the attorney's decision, serious ethical considerations arise. 30
Furthermore, the RICO defendant faces grave consequences when at-
torney fees are forfeitable.' 3 ' In particular, forfeiture of fees violates
the sixth amendment by effectively preventing the accused from exer-
cising the qualified right to choice of counsel.
THE QUALIFIED RIGHT TO CHOICE OF COUNSEL
Under the restraining provision of RICO the United States may
obtain a restraining order to ensure against the destruction or disap-
pearance of forfeitable property.' 3 2 If a restraining order on assets
is obtained, a RICO defendant may not have sufficient funds to re-
tain counsel.' Insufficient funds with which to retain counsel leads
to two possible consequences. First, a defendant may be forced to
proceed without counsel, resulting in a blatant violation of the sixth
amendment.' 34 Forcing a defendant to proceed to trial without counsel,
however, is not likely to occur. 3 ' Second, a more frequent conse-
quence is that a RICO defendant must accept an appointed federal
defender, rather than retain an attorney of choice. 3 6 The second out-
come significantly interferes with a defendant's right to choice of
counsel.
126. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
127. Id. at 849 n.14.
128. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 198-251 and accompanying text.
130. See id.
131. See infra notes 132-251 and accompanying text.
132. See § 1963(e)(1) (1984). See supra note 107 (statute set forth in pertinent part).
133. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
134. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (precisely because forcing a criminal defen-
dant to trial without counsel is so blatant a violation of the sixth amendment, no court would
allow the occurance to take place).
136. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
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A. Traditional Situations When the Qualified Right to Choice
of Counsel is Denied
A defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel includes the right
to select counsel of one's choice.' 37 A defendant's right to choice of
counsel, however, is not absolute.' 38 Several situations give rise to
societal interests that outweigh a defendant's right to choice of counsel.
The court may insist, for example, that counsel be authorized to prac-
tice law in the state. 39 In addition, under appropriate circumstances,
the court may restrict a defendant's right to choice of private counsel
due to scheduling constraints of the court.'" ° The right to counsel
of choice may not be insisted upon at the expense of the power of
the court to ensure the orderly disposition of the court docket.' 4'
Denial of a defendant's choice of counsel right is illustrated in United
States v. Inman.' 2 The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that refusing to grant a continuance to the defendant for
purposes of changing counsel was within the discretion of the court.'
4 3
The defendant in Inman was assigned appointed counsel by the court.
Just seven days before trial, however, the defendant obtained funds
137. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 759 F.2d 968,
972 (2d Cir. 1985). "It therefore follows that in assuring a meaningful defense, and in the
preparatory stages long before trial, an accused has the fundamental right to be represented
by counsel of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); see also United
States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S.
259 (1984). "The right to be represented by counsel of one's choosing has long been regarded
as part and parcel of the 'fundamental' right to be heard through counsel." United States
v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1982). "And we have consistently said that a defendant
who retains counsel has a right 'of constitutional dimension' to the counsel of his choice."
Curcio, 694 F.2d at 23; See United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969); United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir. 1973).
"There can be no doubt that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to counsel of his own
choice to assist in his defense." Smith v. United States, 216 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1954).
138. Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978). "[I]t is a settled principle
that the right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute as is the right to assistance of counsel."
Id. United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1978); Sheiner, 410 F.2d at 342. While
not absolute, this right "should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court." Id. "The sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not provide defendants with an
absolute right to the lawyer of their choice." Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir.
1981); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1978); Urquhart v. Lockhark,
726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984). "While it is clear that an accused who is financially
able to retain counsel of his own choosing must not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity
to do so, it is also clear that the right to retain counsel of one's choice is not absolute."
Id. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. W. LAFAvE, J. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE § 11.4 (1985).
140. See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
141. United States v. Lee, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1956); Smith v. United States, 288
F. 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1923).
142. 483 F.2d 738 (1973).
143. Id. at 740.
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with which to hire private counsel."' The request for a continuance
in order for the newly employed attorney to prepare for trial was
denied.' The trial judge ordered defendant's appointed counsel to
continue to represent the defendant.' 6 The federal court reasoned that
the defendant's sixth amendment right included a reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain counsel of one's own choosing. This right may not,
however, be exercised at a point in the proceedings when the timely
scheduling of cases would be upset.'47
A court may also deny the right to choice of counsel when a defen-
dant has already obtained private counsel.'4 8 This situation frequent-
ly arises when retained counsel suddenly becomes ill' 49 or must par-
ticipate in another case scheduled at the same time.' 0 In these cir-
cumstances, the defendant is prompted to request a continuance.'"'
Provided adequate counsel is available a court may insist that the
case proceed as scheduled with another attorney.' 2 Therefore, a defen-
dant's right to choice of counsel may be subverted when a balancing
test reveals that the societal interest of prompt and efficient administra-
tion of justice outweighs the defendant's interest in choosing an at-
torney.'
Instances may arise when a defendant attempts to use the right to
choice of counsel to achieve a tactical advantage.3 4 The accused may
request a continuance, alleging an exercise of the right to choice of
counsel.' 5 In reality, however, the defendant is trying to achieve a
delay in the trial which will result in the unavailability of prosecution
witnesses.' 6 If a court detects that strategic manipulation is the motive
144. Id. at 739.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 740; see also Burton, 584 F.2d at 490. "The condition of most criminal dockets
demands reasonably prompt disposition of cases; when cases are set far in advance for a day
certain, an unreasonable delay in one case only serves to delay other cases, and this carries
the potential for prejudice to the rights of other defendants." Id. The scheduling of cases
critically affects the availability of prosecution witnesses. Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1324 n.9. "That
delays and postponement only increase the reluctance of witnesses to appear in court . ..
is a phenomenon which scarcely needs elucidation." Accommodation of one defendant may
prejudice other defendants. "Played to an extreme conclusion, this indiscriminate game of judicial
musical chairs could collapse any semblance of sound administration. . ." Id.
148. See Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1981); Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1320.
149. Sloppy, 649 F.2d at 719.
150. Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1320.
151. See Slappy, 649 F.2d at 719; Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1319.
152. United States v. Ramey, 539 F. Supp. 60, 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); see Burton, 584 F.2d
at 498.
153. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 591 (1964).
154. See Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1323.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1324 n.9.
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behind the exercise of the right, the court has discretion to deny the
qualified right to choice of counsel." 7
Should a RICO defendant request a continuance the court must
balance the defendant's right to choice of counsel against the public
interest in the orderly administation of justice.' 8 Accordingly, if the
balance is struck in favor of the public interest, the defendant's right
to choice of counsel will be denied. 5 9 The RICO defendant, however,
will generally seek to exercise the right to choice of counsel at an
earlier point in the proceedings.' 60
B. Choice of Counsel in the RICO Setting
A mechanical test does not exist for determining when a defen-
dant's right to choice of counsel should be denied.'' The decision
requires a balancing test that analyzes the circumstances of each par-
ticular case. 6 2 The factors that must be considered in determining
whether a defendant should be granted a continuance in order to
exercise the right to choice of counsel include: (1) whether the re-
quest came at a point sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the
trial court to adjust the court calendar; (2) the length of the conti-
nuance requested; (3) whether the continuance would seriously inconve-
nience witnesses, litigants, opposing counsel, and the court; and (4)
whether the requested delay is for a legitimate reason or is dilatory
and contrived.' 6 3 When these factors are applied to the RICO set-
ting, the balance weighs in favor of allowing the defendant to exer-
cise the right to choice of counsel.'
64
Traditionally, courts have denied the right to choice of counsel only
when the orderly administration of justice would be impaired by allow-
157. Id. at 1323. "It is a right and a proper tool of the defendant; it cannot be used merely
as a manipulative monkey wrench." Id. "A defendant cannot assume the right to choose counsel
affords the right to obtain a delay at his whim and caprice, or to obtain a reversal because
he was unable to frustrate justice." United States v. Grow, 349 F.2d 182, 210 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968). "Rather, the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion requires
a delicate balance between a defendant's . . . right to adequate representation by counsel of
his choice and the general interest in the prompt and efficient administation of justice." Gan-
dy, 569 F.2d at 1323.
158. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
159. See supra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.
160. Telephone conversation with A. J. Kramer, Esq., supra note 33.
161. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589.
162. Id. See also Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 1958).
163. Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1324. See Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971)
(court used same factors as Gandy). See also W. LAFAvE, J. IsRAEL, CRMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 11.4 (1985).
164. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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ing the defendant to exercise the right.16 In addition, the orderly ad-
ministration of justice has been deemed impaired only when the follow-
ing two facts coexist: (1) the defendant requests a continuance in order
to exercise the right; and (2) the continuance is requested shortly before
trial or while the trial is in progress.' 66 In RICO prosecutions, neither
of these factors is generally present.'67 The complexity of RICO cases
prompts defendants to employ counsel well in advance of trial.'68 Con-
sequently, continuances are not required before or during trial pur-
suant to the exercise of the right to choice of counsel in the RICO
setting. Furthermore, when the factors in the traditional balancing
test'69 are applied, they weigh in favor of permitting the RICO defen-
dant to use the right to choice of counsel. 7" The utilization of the
right by a RICO defendant most often occurs at a point sufficiently
in advance of trial to permit the court to adjust the court calendar.' 7'
As a result, witnesses, litigants, opposing counsel, and the court are
not inconvenienced. 7 ' Therefore, the exercise of the right to choice
of counsel by a RICO defendant will not obstruct the orderly pro-
cedure of the courts or interfere with the fair administration of
justice. 73
165. See Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 575.
166. See Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1320 (defendant moved for a continuance on the day trial
was scheduled to begin in order for counsel of choice to be present); Inman, 483 F.2d at 739
(defendant requested continuance seven days before trial in order for recently retained counsel
to prepare); Ramey, 559 F. Supp. at 62 (defendant wanted to substitute counsel less than two
weeks prior to narcotics case); Burton, 584 F.2d at 488 (defendant requested a 30 to 60 day
continuance in 28 count narcotics case on the day of trial in order to replace counsel).
167. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 844-45. Counsel began to represent defendant on September
19, 1984. On January 3, 1985 counsel was served with a subpoena duces tecum. At this point
the trial was not scheduled to begin for some time. The defendant had exercised his right to
choice of counsel at least four months before the trial was scheduled to begin. A continuance
was not required in order to exercise the right. Id. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723,
723-24 (1981). The defendant was indicted under RICO on April 18, 1979. Private counsel
was retained in "mid-April." Id. Generally, RICO cases are scheduled for trial no less than
ninty to 120 days after indictment. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350. In addition, some RICO
defendants have attorneys on a continual retainer. This allows counsel to begin working on
a RICO case well in advance of trial and no continuance is necessary in order to exercise the
right to choice of counsel. See Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Life Support," supra note 119.
168. Telephone conversation with A. J. Kramer, Esq. supra note 33.
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (balancing factors presented).
170. In fact, the factors may be inapplicable when the defendant exercises the right absent
a request for a continuance, since every factor in the balancing test mentions a continuance. Id.
171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (factor 1); see also supra notes 167-70 and
accompanying text.
172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (factor 4).
173. Use of private counsel instead of a federal defender may speed up the administration
of justice in the RICO setting. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. "The typical public defender
handles far more criminal cases per time unit than does the typical private attorney." Stover
& Eckart, A Systematic Comparison of Public Defenders and Private Attorneys, 3 Am. J. CRI?8.
L. 265, 278 (1975). Private counsel often has greater resources and more expertise than some
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C. Weaknesses of the Payden Decision
The Payden court stated that society has an interest in precluding
a defendant from retaining a skilled attorney with illegally obtained
funds.' 74 Just as "a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with the
fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the Rolls-Royce
of attorneys from these same tainted funds.""' The Payden court
failed to address the more important constitutional interest, namely,
the preservation of the right to counsel and any additional implied
rights inherent in the right to counsel.'76 Society has a great interest
in seeing that these rights are not compromised.
77
If subsection (m) is used to restrain funds which a defendant in-
tends to use to employ an attorney, the qualified right to choice of
counsel is compromised. '7  The RICO defendant is denied any exer-
cise of the right.' 79 The accused never receives the advantage of having
a court apply a balancing test to the facts of the case. Rather than
applying the long standing balancing test, 8 ' a blanket, per se rule
is applied. Although the right to counsel of one's choice is not ab-
solute, a rule that absolutely denies the right is improper.'8 ' As the
court stated in United States v. Flanagan," a defendant's right to
choice of counsel should not be dealt with lightly or arbitrarily. "
The proposition that appointed counsel is available when money
to retain private counsel is seized, does not meet the standards of
the Flanagan court for dealing with the right to choice of counsel.' 4
public defenders. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348. The percentage of money awarded to the public
defender for fact investigation is minimal and most public defenders feel the inadequacy. Stover
& Eckart, A Systematic Comparison of Public Defenders and Private Attorneys, 3 AM. J. CaM.
L. 265, 275 (1975). Private counsel may therefore be prepared for trial earlier and require
less delay.
174. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14. The societal interest is to deprive offenders
and organizations of economic power. The use of tainted funds to obtain the best attorneys
results in loss of potentially forfeitable property. The defendant often escapes justice and the
economic power remains. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198. "The right to counsel belongs to guilty defen-
dants as well as innocent ones." Id.
177. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
178. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
179. Id. at 1348. The "threat of forfeiture .. .prevents [defendants] from using their
assets to secure counsel of their choice." Id.
180. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.
181. See Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 386.
182. 679 F.2d 1072.
183. Id. at 1076.
184. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349."The impact on the adversary process occasioned by
the ability of the government to seize attorney fees is of . . . [great] concern. The retort to
the claim of denial of counsel of one's choice, that appointed counsel is available, pays no
more than lip service to . .. the right to counsel."Id.
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This argument also ignores the exigencies of RICO cases.' 5 RICO
cases are complex. Vast quantities of facts and information must be
collected, often involving investigation of several worldwide business
enterprises.' 6 The prosecution of a defendant under RICO can last
as long as two to three years from grand jury investigation to the
end of trial.' 7 Federal defenders normally are appointed 90 to 120
days prior to trial.' 8 Because of the complexity of a RICO case, 90
to 120 days for preparation is inadequate. 8 9 By assuring that a RICO
defendant does not acquire an advantage through use of a private
attorney, the government may obtain a tactical advantage. 19 The pro-
secutor could exclude any private defense counsel determined to be
a skilled adversary or threat, by appending a charge of forfeiture to
an indictment under RICO.'' While most prosecutors may act in good
faith, the potential for prosecutorial manipulation cannot be ignored."'
RICO defendants should be allowed the right to choice of counsel.
The accused should be barred from using potentially forfeitable funds
only when one of the traditional reasons for denial of the right is
present. 93 Trial courts must examine each case individually. Judges
should determine, pursuant to a balancing test, whether exercise of
the right to choice of counsel will obstruct the procedure in the courts,
interfere with the fair administration of justice, or serve as a strategic
ploy for the defense. 94 If potential exists for any of these results,
the interests of society and judicial economy must prevail.' The
balancing test in the RICO setting is a sensible alternative to an ab-
solute rule denying a defendant the right to choose counsel. The
balancing approach will generally result in allowing the RICO defen-
185. Id.
186. Id. A recent RICO case illustrates the national scope of some RICO enterprises. The
case involved a thoroughbred horse race-fixing scheme. The defendants bribed jockeys, trainers,
horse owners, and track personnel. The outcome of more than 200 thoroughbred races were
altered at race tracks in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts. In addition, the defendant had agreements with major bookmakers in New York
City and Las Vegas. Digest of RICO Investigations, supra note 5, at 26.




191. The court believed this situation would undermine the very nature of the adversary
process. Id.
192. Rogers stated that even the opportunity for such abuse cannot be tolerated in the adver-
sary system. Id.
193. See supra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
194. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 931; Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1323.
195. See Burton, 584 F.2d at 490. The court "is free to deny a continuance . . . [in it
reasonably concludes that the delay would be unreasonable in the context of the particular
case." Id.
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dant to exercise the right.' 96 The result will not only benefit the ac-
cused by preserving sixth amendment rights, but will benefit the courts
by saving time'97 and will ensure that the right to counsel is not slowly
eroded. Another important advantage of allowing the use of poten-
tially forfeitable funds to retain counsel is that attorneys representing
RICO defendants will not be faced with professional conflicts.
RICO DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The attorney who faces the threat that fees may be forfeited will
have to deal with several potential conflicts of interest. '9 Three areas
affected by a forfeiture of fees construction of the forfeiture provi-
sion will be explored: (a) the time and effort an attorney spends on
a RICO case, 99 (b) grand jury subpoening of RICO attorneys,"' and
(c) plea bargaining." ° ' Investigation into the three areas will illustrate
the dilemma faced by RICO defense attorneys if fees are subject to
forfeiture. Moreover, the effect of potential conflicts on a defendant's
sixth amendment rights will be exposed.
A. Attorney Expenditure of Time and Effort
The possibility exists that an attorney may not expend sufficient
time or effort to prepare for a RICO case because of the threat of
forfeiture. 20 2 The Payden court, however, held that this conflict does
not exist. 20 3 The canons of professional responsibility require counsel
to represent a defendant zealously despite the risk that the attorney
may never receive compensation for work performed.20 4 However, at-
196. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
198. For purposes of this comment, conflict of interest does not represent a conflict of
interest in the traditional sense (as when an attorney represents two codefendants), but an in-
ternal conflict between the attorney's interest in preserving fees and the obligation to represent
the client's best interests.
199. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
202. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
203. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14. Alternatively, the court offered a solution to any
potential conflict. The trial could be bifurcated. The defendant would retain or be appointed
one lawyer for the trial and a different attorney to represent his interests at a forfeiture pro-
ceeding. Id.
204. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPONSmmrrY DR 7-101 (1985); but see Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. at 196. The Badalamenti court took the position that forfeiture of attorneys'
fees under subsection (m) may result in an automatic violation of another canon of profes-
sional responsibility. The RICO defense attorney "might . . . be found to have accepted a
contingent fee in a criminal case in violation of DR 2-106(c)," since retention of the fee depends
on gaining an acquittal in the client's case. Id. "A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement
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torneys sometimes violate their duties despite canons of ethics.2 °0 The
ultimate result of these violations may be the impairment of an other-
wise adequate defense strategy. 06 Statutes should not be construed
to create conflicts or compromises, which, if undiscovered, would
seriously hamper a defendant's right to counsel. 07 If the 1984 RICO
amendments are construed to include forfeiture of defense attorneys'
fees, the defendant's right to counsel is compromised if counsel ex-
pends less than sufficient time and effort on the client's case.2 08 This
result is contrary to familiar statutory construction.2 0 9
B. Grand Jury Subpoening of RICO Defense Attorneys
The threat of being subpoenaed before a grand jury also creates
conflict for the RICO attorney. An attorney representing a RICO
defendant is sometimes subpoenaed before a grand jury to obtain in-
formation on the attorney-client fee arrangement.2 10 RICO defense
for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case." MODEL
CODE OF PROrSSIONAL REsPoNsmrrY DR 2-106(c) (1985). Contingent fees in criminal cases
are a special concern of the law because of "the danger of corrupting justice." Peyton v.
Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 89, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959). This type of arrangement is illegal and
void as against public policy. Id. MAcKiNNON, CON omcEr FEES FOR LEGAL SERvICE 52 (1964)
(a Report of the ABA). See also Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DuxE L.J.
1291, 1293 (1979). Another potential problem with contingencey fee arrangements is that such
agreements do not always provide incentives to work hard. Counsel who disposes of cases with
little time invested can go on to the next case, thereby becoming enriched more quickly. Id.
205. See MODEL CODE OF PROSFSSIONAL REsPoNsIBILIY, Preamble and Preliminary State-
ment (1985) (code designed in part to judge "transgressors").
206. See Carrington, supra note 204, at 1292. While the extent which zealous advocacy
influences the outcomes of disputes is unknown, "it [is] not unlikely that the degree of in-
fluence is in part a product of the degree of effort expended by the advocate." Id. See also
Stover & Eckart, A Systematic Comparison of Public Defenders and Private Attorneys, 3 Am .
J. CRI. L. 265, 275-77 (1975). The importance of factual investigation to trial success is generally
accepted. Private attorneys tend to vary the amount of investigation with the client's ability
to pay. Id.
207. Bernhoz & Herman, Protecting Innocent Owners from Drug-Related Forfeiture, 2 IN-
SIDE DRUG LAw 4 (1985). "[A]s a matter of familiar statutory construction, whenever a statute
will bear either of two interpretations, one of which avoids any question of constitutionality
and the other of which would involve the court in the confrontation of a substantial constitu-
tional question, the former construction is preferred." Id. A strong argument in favor of non-
forfeiture is made by some courts based on a construction theory. See United States v. Rubin,
559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977). Because forfeiture of an individual's property was unknown
to criminal law prior to RICO there is "a need for circumspection." The court stated that
when an ambiguity exists in the construction of a criminal statute, any conflict should be resolved
in favor of leniency. The court viewed this canon to have particular application to forfeiture
statutes. Id. See also Berholz & Herman, Protecting Innocent Owners from Drug-Related
Forfeiture, 2 INsIDE DRUO LAw 3 (1985). "Under well-settled canons of statutory construction,
ambiguities in the operation of a statute are to be resolved in favor of an interpretation that
favors the interests of equity and avoids injurious consequences." Id.
208. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
209. See supra note 207.
210. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 843; supra note 113; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 195;
see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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attorneys are subpoenaed for two reasons. The first reason is to help
prove the government's case against the defendant. 21' Specifically, the
information is used to either establish the defendant's receipt of pro-
fits from racketeering activity, or to lead to evidence or
coconspirators. '2 The second reason for which an attorney may be
subpoenaed to discuss the fee arrangement is to discover if the fees
were paid out of proceeds subject to forfeiture. 2 3 The government
seeks this information to determine whether the fees themselves are
forfeitable. 21 4 The potential of being subpoenaed creates an ethical
conflict for the attorney.
An attorney has an obligation to be well informed of the facts of
the client's case.215 Because of the potential for forfeiture, however,
counsel may be discouraged from discovering facts concerning the
source of fee payments.2 Is Ignorance of these facts ensures that counsel
will not reveal fee information during grand jury testimony. 27 As
a consequence, fees may be safe from forfeiture.18
The conflict between being fully informed of a client's circumstances,
but remaining ignorant of the source of payment in order to con-
tinue to be a bona fide purchaser, has a serious impact upon another
aspect of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The right to counsel
includes more than just the right to representation by competent
counsel at trial. 1 9 The right would be without substance if it did not
include a meaningful attorney-client relationship. 220 A trusting rela-
tionship between client and attorney must be established.22' Consulta-
tion and planning are required to build trust. The benefits derived
from a meaningful attorney-client relationship exemplify the necessity
of trust to the sixth amendment.222
The outcome of a criminal trial often hinges upon the extent to
which the defendant is able to communicate the most intimate and
embarrassing details of personal life to the attorney.223 Complete candor
211. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 846.
212. Although the first method leads to various constitutional issues, use of fee informa-
tion for probative evidential reasons is not within the scope of this comment.
213. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 195.
214. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 846.




219. Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 721. The "attorney-client relationship ... involves not just the casual assistance
of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates
in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney." Id.
222. Id.
223. McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22 (Alaska 1974).
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may reveal defenses or mitigating circumstances that otherwise might
go undiscovered. 24 In In re Grand Jury Investigation,221 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the practice of calling a lawyer
before a grand jury investigation concerning the attorney's client is
disturbing, especially when the government can obtain the informa-
tion elsewhere. 226 The very presence of the attorney in the grand jury
room raises doubts in the client's mind. The defendant may begin
to doubt the lawyer's devotion to the client's interests.227 The resulting
distrust can impair or at least impinge upon the attorney-client rela-
tionship.228
The court in Slappy v. Morris22' 9 agreed with the holding in In re
Grand Jury Investigation. The Slappy court stated that if the defen-
dant loses confidence in counsel's ability to represent the defendant's
best interests, the effectiveness of representation at trial is greatly
diminished. 20 The defendant may be unwilling to follow the attorney's
advice in deciding whether to plead guilty, to testify, to present a
defense, and in deciding which witnesses to call.23' The court in Payden
was unpersuaded by the Slappy and In re Grand Jury Investigation
arguments. The Payden court stated that disclosure by defense counsel
of attorney-client communications, even though the communications
are adverse to the defendant, does not affect counsel's ability to repre-
sent the defendant effectively, as required by the sixth amendment.
232
The Payden court appears to have overlooked certain details of the
problem.
A meaningful attorney-client relationship gives substance to the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 233 Grand jury ques-
tioning of defense counsel about fees is detrimental to this relation-
ship. 3 When an attorney must appear before a grand jury, trust,
along with the free and open communication necessary for a successful
224. Id.
225. 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
226. Id. at 945. The court reiterated the importance of the attorney-client relationship and
the need for the relationship's protection. Id. at 946. See also In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp.
683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Stolar,
397 F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (cases further exemplify the dangers and disadvantages
of calling a defendant's lawyer before the grand jury investigating the client).
227. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. at 946.
228. Id.
229. 649 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1981).
230. Id. at 720.
231. Id. at 720-21.
232. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 846.
233. Slappy, 649 F.2d at 721.
234. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. at 945-46.
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attorney-client relationship, often disappears.2 35  For this reason,
forfeiture of attorneys' fees under subsection (m) should not be
allowed.
C. Plea Bargaining
Another source of conflict for the RICO defense attorney involves
plea bargaining. If attorneys' fees can be forfeited under subsection
(m), counsel would have a motive to negotiate a guilty plea that did
not involve forfeiture, rather than try the case. 236 The attorney has
a motive to avoid expending valuable time and increasing the risk
of incurring forfeiture.2 37 Plea bargaining is often viewed as an in-
dispensable device necessary to keep the courts from becoming over-
burdened.2 38 Plea bargaining, however, is widely criticized as cheapen-
ing and demeaning the entire criminal justice system by transforming
what should be a search for truth into a contest of bargaining and
skill. 239 A defense lawyer uses bargaining skills in two ways. Initially,
the attorney must try to obtain the best possible deal from the pro-
secutor. 2 0 Next, defense counsel must convince the client that the
deal is in the defendant's best interest. 21' Forfeiture of attorneys' fees
would increase the use of plea bargaining.242
When attorneys' fees are potentially forfeitable an ulterior motive
is added to the bargaining process. Consequently, an already imperfect
system would become increasingly flawed by the temptation for at-
torneys to consider their own interests during the bargaining process.24 3
Absent the threat of fee forfeiture an attorney may proceed to trial
with a borderline case.244 Under a forfeiture of fees interpretation
of subsection (m), counsel may now bargain with a client's freedom
for the sake of a fee.245
235. Id.
236. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
237. Id.
238. Rubin, How We Can Improve Judicial Treatment of Individual Cases Without Sacrificing
Individual Rights: The Problems of Criminal Law, 70 F.R.D. 79, 88 (1976).
239. Id. at 81.
240. Id. at 82.
241. Id. See also Parker, Plea Bargaining, I AM. J. CiuM. L. 187 (1972). "Plea bargaining
is not always a 'gentlemen's game' . . . [The plea bargaining] practice lends credibility to the
view that our criminal justice system is less an adversary one than a system of brokerage,
in which 'ask' and 'bid' quotations are made not in dollars, but in years of men's lives."
Id. at 203.
242. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196. "The statute would give attorneys a motive
to negotiate a guilty plea that did not involve forfeiture." Id.
243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
244. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
245. Id.
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Serious ethical dilemmas are created when the 1984 RICO amend-
ments are construed to include the forfeiture of attorneys' fees. 46
The conflicts these dilemmas cause make the defense of RICO suspects
more difficult and less rewarding for the defense attorney.24 7 Although
counsel suffers an economic and emotional impact, the RICO defen-
dant experiences a greater loss. Specifically, the attorney's interest
in protecting forfeitable fees leads to impingement of the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel.2' 8 In addition, a defense attorney
is tempted to spend less time on a RICO case due to potential
forfeiture.2 49 The critical attorney-client relationship loses the element
of trust, resulting in less effective representation at trial. 2" Finally,
plea bargaining is more likely to be engaged in by the attorney to
protect fees.2"' The result of these conflicts is a significant compromise
of the defendant's interests and the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Legislative change is necessary to ensure that these conflicts will not
arise.
PROPOSAL
In view of the serious problems created by forfeiture of attorneys'
fees under subsection (in), attorneys should be considered bona fide
purchasers for value. Whether courts construing the 1984 RICO amend-
ments for the first time will consider attorneys bona fide purchasers
remains unclear. As a consequence, subsection (in) should specifical-
ly provide for the exclusion of attorneys' fees from forfeiture under
subsection (in). The following proposal achieves a balanced result:
An attorney representing a client for violations of section 1962
may not be subject to the third party forfeiture provision unless the
court determines, pursuant to a hearing petitioned for by the govern-
ment, that the interests of justice require forfeiture.
The court shall allow forfeiture only upon a showing by the
government that (a) reasonable cause exists to believe that fees were
transferred as part of some artifice or sham, or (b) that nonforfeiture
of funds intended for employment of counsel will reasonably cause
an interference with the administration of justice or the scheduling
of the court docket. If, after notice to the attorney and the defen-
dant and an opportunity for a hearing, the court determines the
246. See supra notes 198-242 and accompanying text.
247. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
248. See infra notes 198-242 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
250. See infra notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
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government has not satisfied either (a) or (b) above, the court shall
enter an order that attorneys' fees shall not be forfeited.
The foregoing proposal would eliminate the constitutional and ethical
problems under subsection (m), while preserving the government's in-
terest in attaching fees paid to attorneys who are conduits for organized
crime. At the same time, the proposal would preserve the defendant's
right to choose counsel under appropriate circumstances. The first
sentence of the proposal will make clear to courts that RICO defense
attorneys are exempt from third party forfeiture. Thus the conflict
that arose in the Rogers, Payden, and Badalamenti cases will be
resolved.
The proposal also allows the government to attach attorneys' fees
when justified. The concern of the court in Payden that RICO defen-
dants are preserving their assets by disguising the transaction as a
fee transfer is addressed. When transformation of property for
forfeiture evasion purposes is discovered, the assets will be subject
to an immediate restraining order and forfeited upon conviction. The
qualified right to choice of counsel problem is also addressed. The
proposal assures that a balancing test is applied before the right is
subject to divestment. Therefore, no per se rule denying the right to
choice of counsel is imposed. Finally, the proposal makes clear that
if the government cannot meet its burden under the statute, attorneys'
fees shall not be forfeited.
CONCLUSION
The 1984 amendments to RICO have the potential for creating grave
ethical complications for a RICO defense attorney. The changes also
impinge upon a RICO defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
This comment has explored attorney conflicts and potential sixth
amendment violations that will result if courts interpret the new
forfeiture provisions to include attorneys' fees. The seizure of a defen-
dant's property under the restraining provision will often result in
a lack of funds available to the accused for the retention of counsel.
This restraint causes an absolute bar to the qualified right to choice
of counsel. The threat of forfeiture of fees also produces conflicts
of interest which further impair the right to counsel. These conflicts
are far reaching. The impact is felt in the areas of plea bargaining
and the attorney-client relationship. The conflicts also affect the time
and effort exerted in RICO cases by defense counsel. The proposal
of this comment provides a remedy for problems faced by RICO defen-
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dants while preventing abuse of the rights of the accused. In addi-
tion, nonforfeiture of attorneys' fees will rescue RICO defense
attorneys from conflicts that ultimately would demean the field of
criminal defense.
Sharon A. Frame
